China needs transparent tax system

By LIU JUNNING
BEIJING, China

As red ideology fades in the hearts and minds of the Chinese people and social transition progresses, the phenomenon of the taxpayer has emerged once again in China. There has been little resistance to the reintroduction of taxes, except from some extreme leftists. People may have different views about their identity as taxpayers, but the undeniable fact is that all Chinese citizens are now paying taxes, directly or indirectly, to the ruling party or to the government.

However, although the people's legal status as taxpayers is recognized, the rights that should accompany this status do not apply. There is no system by which representatives of the taxpayers can oversee or monitor the tax-collection practices and procedures. There are no effective measures to prevent the various levels of government, the tax consumers, from extending their hands into the purses of the taxpayers. The taxpayers are not informed as to the amount of tax revenue collected or how it is spent; they have no say concerning the imposition of taxes or the expenditures of the state.

Unlike taxpayers in countries with a democratic constitution, those in China hold a dual position: they are owners of the state -- though without any seat in the government -- and at the same time they are a disadvantaged class. On one hand, the legal position of the taxpayer is supreme. Every citizen, not the ruling party, is supposed to be the owner of the state. A republic ruled by a constitutional system is owned not by any social class or political party, but by all the taxpayers.

On the other hand, however, in front of the ruling party's unrestricted political power, all the taxpayers in China are a disadvantaged class. Under the taxation system, everyone is a victim. What differs between them is merely that some taxpayers -- those who are not just citizens but also power holders -- can make up for the disadvantage of being a citizen by using their power.

But unfortunately, most taxpayers are powerless and truly disadvantaged. Whether they are rich or poor, they cannot argue with those in power. Moreover, if the rich do not conspire with the powerful, their losses could be greater. Those who impose taxes not only make various excuses to force the taxpayers to open their purses, they also censure some taxpayers for tax evasion in order to threaten and bully them. However, the powerful never make public the properties they own, or pay taxes on the illicit money they gain through corrupt deals.

Increasingly, economists, jurists, social leaders and media are addressing the topic of taxes, while the peoples' tax burden only grows heavier. China holds a high rank in the world for the number of people living in poverty, who therefore suffer under the taxation system; this has become a hot issue in society. Thus, a mechanism should be put in place to monitor the taxation system.

Monitoring the tax system would mean evaluating the services rendered by the government in exchange for the taxpayers' money, in order to ensure the fairness and justice of this exchange. This task should begin with the citizens, who must safeguard the taxpayers' purses. In brief, monitoring the system would mean organizing the taxpayers themselves to defend their rights as citizens, to advocate a proper, legitimate, transparent and reasonable system of taxation, to monitor the usage of tax revenue and offer suggestions for preventing abuse by both tax collectors and taxpayers. Taxpayers should be educated to know their rights and know what services they are paying for.

The tax monitoring system would be perverted if the government viewed it as a method of seeking new tax revenue. Its fundamental purpose would be to appeal to the authorities to impose taxes properly and righteously, at the lowest practical level, to allow citizens to hold onto their wealth. Eventually, the taxpayers should be able to assume their position as the true owners of the country.

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(Liu Junning is a researcher on social issues at the Institute of Chinese Culture under China's Ministry of Culture. He was formerly a political researcher at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and a visiting scholar at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University. This article is edited and translated from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online. The original may be found at www.ncn.org and http://liujunning.vip.bokee.com/ . ©Copyright Liu Junning.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/01/25/china_needs_transparent_tax_system/9670/

Lessons of Taiwan's elections

By LI ZHINING

BEIJING, China

Published: January 17, 2008

Scenes from Taiwan's elections are always exciting. Despite the struggles between parties, these democratic elections never strike terror in the hearts of the people like the struggles that took place in China during the Cultural Revolution. At that time violence often broke out when factions struggled against each other.

However, most elections in the world proceed in peace. In immature democracies there is sometimes cheating, such as in Eastern Europe during the so-called "color revolutions." Another example is Iraq. On election day, the people were afraid of bombs that could go off at any moment, yet they rushed in large numbers to the voting booths to express their hopes for peace.

Why are elections usually peaceful while the Cultural Revolution was so violent? It is because the struggle between factions during the Cultural Revolution lacked proper procedures aimed at a certain result. With no clear aim, one faction defeated the other through violence.

Neither faction had a clear purpose, nor would either one admit that the other had won. All they could do was continue to fight until the central authority "expressed its attitude" in the conflict. As soon as the official "attitude" was made clear, the losing faction would be overwhelmed.

This is because there was no culture of elections, only a culture of violence. Therefore there could be no result other than a decision or opinion from a major leader or the central authority. The majority of the people could not decide anything; only the autocratic leaders held the right to make decisions.

If there had been a culture of elections, where every citizen had a vote, there would not have been a Cultural Revolution. Of course, small conflicts occasionally break out during Taiwan's elections, but they do not affect the whole situation.

As Taiwan's democracy matures, it provides lessons for the future democratization of mainland China. The behavior of Democratic Progressive Party politicians led to their resounding defeat in Saturday's legislative elections.

Immediately after the election, in which the Kuomintang won a strong majority in the legislature, analysts began commenting that if the party also wins the presidential election on March 22 it may represent a loss for democratic politics. The fact that people are concerned about a return to authoritarianism demonstrates the growing maturity of democracy in Taiwan. But Ma Ying-jeou, the KMT's presidential candidate, behaved responsibly as a politician and was not overwhelmed by the party's election victory.

Furthermore, commentators reminded everyone that the KMT's victory was not the result of the party's good work, but rather the result of voter dissatisfaction with the ruling party. Thus, if the KMT takes back the ruling power, it definitely must not resort to "dirty money politics" again. Otherwise it will not be able to retain that position.

The Taiwanese also recognized that there was no significant shift in the fundamental voter bases of the blue and green camps in terms of the legislative elections, despite the blue camp's win. The blue KMT won 5.01 million votes, while the green DPP won 3.61 million. The remaining minor parties shared the rest of the 1.16 million ballots. In total, the pan-green camp won about 4 million votes, not a small figure.

In the presidential election of 2000, the DPP won with just over 30 percent of the vote because the People First Party split from the KMT, dividing the blue camp. Among the three candidates, Lien Chan, representing the KMT, got just over 20 percent of the vote. This was similar to the situation in South Korea in 1987, when the result of struggles between Kim Young-Sam and Kim Dae-Jung benefited Roh Tae-Woo, who won with 36.6 percent of the vote.

If Taiwan's election law had required a candidate to win over 50 percent of the vote or face a second round between the two top contenders, Chen Shui-bian would not have won the presidency.

This time, it appears that the KMT could win in the March presidential election, having obtained somewhere between 51 and 58 percent of the votes in the legislative elections. However, in 2000 the combined ballots cast for the blue camp -- for Lien Chan from the KMT and James Soong from the PFP -- surpassed 60 percent. Still, the winner was the DPP team of Chen Shui-bian and Annette Lu. In Saturday's election the pan-green camp won 40 percent of the vote, despite the administration's troubles over the past eight years. What does this mean?

If the KMT does not stay alert and ignores the nearly 40 percent support for the green camp, the story of Chen Shui-bian could be repeated. This is the way party politics should be.

Some senior KMT supporters think that Chen's party lost in the latest elections due to his tactics in eliminating the halo surrounding former President Chiang Kai-shek and his son. But I hold the opposite opinion.

If Chen had not done so, his losses would have been greater. His major problem was his poor administration, not the Chiang issue. Otherwise, with his record of poor achievement, corruption, scandals, weak economic development and poor international interaction, the DPP should have collapsed. But the pan-green still controls 40 percent of the vote because the campaign to remove the Chiangs' halo touched their hearts.

Therefore, if the KMT insists on holding on to the corpse of Chiang Kai-shek, it will one day lose even the pan-blue supporters. The KMT should have paid attention to opinion polls on the deep-blue camp's support for the Chiangs -- only about 5 percent of the people supported this. Undecided voters supported the KMT this time in hopes of improving the falling economy, not to bring back the memorial tablets of the great leaders and place them in the hearts of the people again.

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(Li Zhining is an independent thinker and writer. He was formerly a researcher at the Economic Research Center of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences in Beijing. This article is edited and translated from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original can be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Li Zhining.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2008/01/17/lessons_of_taiwans_elections/2623/

Chinese citizens not equal under the law

By ZHANG MING

BEIJING, China

Published: January 11, 2008

A Guangzhou court has handed a life sentence to a 24-year-old migrant worker named Xu Ting for withdrawing 170,000 yuan (US$24,000) from a malfunctioning ATM. Xu used his own bank card and password, but the ATM generated successive errors, allowing Xu to withdraw more money than he had in the account.

The unexpected discovery that he could make big money from the ATM lured Xu to continue withdrawing the funds. The bank and the prosecutor accused him of stealing, and the court agreed. Under the judgment, all his personal property is to be confiscated and he faces life in prison.

The malfunction of the ATM placed the money within it in an unprotected situation. This is like putting a huge amount of money in an open box with no one watching. If one really examines who is responsible for this crime, the place to begin is with the bank staff responsible for that questionable ATM. If the bank management is not found to have been negligent, one should look at the factory that produced the ATM, to which a claim for compensation could be made.

However, the only one to be punished in this case was the young worker who received life imprisonment. In a sense, he merely noticed the box on the street with the money in it and no one watching, and could not resist taking some of the money. This is very similar to the situation in which someone picks up a lost wallet and doesn't return it to the owner, although Xu's action was more serious than that.

Nowadays in China, how many people could resist taking that money if it were right in front of their eyes? It's true that those who pick up lost money and return it deserve praise. However, Xu was a young worker who earned less than 1,000 yuan (US$150) per month. It is odd and evil that his failure to resist temptation would land him in prison for life. Is this justice?

Many financial crimes have been committed by officials and bank professionals in recent years in China. The State Treasury and banks have served as personal ATMs to these wrongdoers. They have stolen huge amounts of funds that were entrusted to their care, and citizens have felt tremendous anger over such crimes.

Compared with those hundreds of thousands of corrupt officials and bank staff in China, Xu's behavior was a small case, although it could be considered embezzlement. Nevertheless, most people involved in those big cases were handed much lighter sentences than the poor worker.

This judgment reminds me of three old Chinese sayings. The first is: "No sentence will be given to an official, and no privilege will be given to a commoner." Another is: "Stealing a hook brings death, while stealing a country brings nobility." A saying that appeared later in history is: "A prince who breaks the law deserves the same punishment as a commoner."

In reality, the first two sayings have proven true countless times no matter how the times change. But the third saying is merely to comfort the common people. Unfortunately, this case is a repetition of the second saying.

Another reason that Xu received such a severe punishment was that the money he took was from a national bank and was considered state property. For a long time, property has been placed in different categories in China. Stealing from an individual is quite different from stealing from the state.

Furthermore, the most untouchable money is the money in state banks. There was once a time when stealing state or collective property and damaging collective production were considered crimes, even when there were no criminal or civil laws. One might be accused and sentenced for stealing even an ear of corn if the leader wanted to get serious about it.

We can quietly accept the sacredness of collectivism and nationalism, even the sacredness of the state. However, the citizen should also be considered sacred. After all, the government is promoting "people-oriented" policies.

In front of the law, the young worker's situation should be given equal consideration to the national bank's loss of 170,000 yuan. Furthermore, the money in an ATM should have no more value than the money in a worker's pants pocket. Both should receive equal consideration when they are lost.

It's a pity that this kind of equal consideration did not exist in that court where the young worker was given a life sentence.

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(Zhang Ming is a professor and supervisor of doctoral students at the School of International Relations of the People's University of China in Beijing. He has a PhD in politics, and is the former dean of the Politics Department at People's University. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online. The original may be found at www.ncn.org and zhangming.vip.bokee.com ©Copyright Zhang Ming.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Society_Culture/2008/01/11/chinese_citizens_not_equal_under_the_law/6521/

What America Must Do: The China Syndrome

By Yang Jianli

January/February 2008

Showing that U.S. friendship is not for sale will earn the respect of a billion people.

EDEL RODRIGUEZ FOR FP

Related to this article:

· What America Must Do

· Author Interviews:

o Yang Jianli

o Kenneth Rogoff

o Reza Aslan

o Dmitri Trenin

o Jessica T. Mathews

For additional Web extras from the January/February 2008 issue of FP, click here.

Many people think that the United States’ influence has waned and its image has been tarnished. I have yet to arrive at the same conclusion. Since I was released from a Chinese prison in April 2007, having served five years for investigating labor unrest, I have spoken to a great number of people around the world about this very topic. In my mind, the United States remains a great country, and its people a great people. It continues to be the only global force with the authority to promote democratization and safeguard freedom and security.

I do believe, however, that the United States has a consistency problem. It is a country that was founded on the principles of freedom, democracy, and certain inalienable rights of the common people, but the desire to meet short-term interests tends to compromise faithfulness to these principles. That inconsistency weakens American credibility.

Since the violent crackdown on protesters in Tiananmen Square in 1989, U.S. policy toward China has been fickle, even erratic. One day, trade is used as leverage to promote human rights in China, and the next day a thousand reasons are given why that leverage should not be used. Many people wrongly assume that pressuring the Chinese government on human rights triggers ill will toward Americans on the part of ordinary Chinese citizens. In fact, it is the United States’ constant seesawing that reinforces the popular belief that Americans only act for their own material gain. The lofty statements followed by inaction have led the Chinese people to conclude that some American politicians, scholars, and businesspeople are hypocrites. Their self-imposed censorship when dealing with the Chinese government is disappointing. I have never opposed trading with China, but I cannot support a policy that is so wholly inconsistent.

The next American president can take concrete steps to demonstrate that U.S. policy on China cannot be bought and sold. Human rights conditions, no matter how small, should be attached to every issue the United States brings to China. Little by little, the United States must push for change. The administration should systematically and publicly engage Chinese democrats both within and outside China, with the long-term goal of helping to establish a constitutional democracy. And finally, the United States should push China to hold local elections. Beijing is not wholly opposed to the idea, because it may help diminish the local corruption and abuses of power that the central government is eager to curb.

Promoting democracy and freedom around the world will panic dictators and even puzzle those who have been brainwashed by their rulers, but it will not lead to disrespect. Only paying lip service to cherished beliefs or failing to follow up promises with actions will court disdain.

Yang Jianli is president of the U.S.-based Foundation for China in the 21st Century. In April 2007, he was released from prison in China, where he was tortured and held in solitary confinement, after serving five years on political charges.

What America Must Do: Yang Jianli

Posted January 2008

Yang Jianli spent five years in a Chinese prison on political charges. He tells FP why he believes some American policymakers are hypocrites when it comes to China and what he hopes President Bush will say at the Beijing Games.

	Related to this article: What America Must Do The China Syndrome By Yang Jianli Author Interviews: Kenneth Rogoff Reza Aslan Dmitri Trenin Jessica T. Mathews For additional Web extras from the January/February 2008 issue of FP, click here.

Foreign Policy: How has U.S. policy toward China over the past decade been inconsistent, as you argue in your article?

Yang Jianli: I’ll give you two examples: Bill Clinton, in his 1992 campaign, criticized the [George H.W.] Bush administration for its soft stance against the Chinese communist regime right after the [Tiananmen] massacre. [Clinton] vowed to stand firmly on human rights issues when dealing with China. But he didn’t stick to what he promised, which was a surprise and dismay to my colleagues in the dissident community. In 1994, he suddenly delinked human rights issues from trade, a stand that turned out to be even softer than the Bush administration’s. And in 2001, again, the United States allowed China’s accession to the WTO [World Trade Organization] without almost any human rights conditions. That’s what I mean by inconsistent. It’s about credibility. If you always change whatever position you take, whether wrong to right or right to wrong, then the other party knows that you are changeable. Whenever it comes to a serious issue, they will press you to change, not themselves.

FP: You also argue that some academics are hypocrites in their stance toward China. In what sense?

YJ: They have a self-imposed censorship and fear because they try very hard to compete with one another for access to the top Chinese leaders. They are afraid that if they are outspoken and criticize the regime, opportunities to go to China will disappear. But there are very clear scholarly principles and standards: to be impartial, to be objective. And they have given them up for these opportunities.

China cannot go backward to the old days, the dark days with the door closed to the outside world. They cannot do it. The Chinese regime, like its predecessors, is increasingly worried about its international image. They will still allow [these academics] to enter China to do their studies because they need them for their image. So, why the self-censorship?

FP: Given the fact that China holds so much U.S. debt, do you believe the United States still has the kind of leverage it used to with China?

YJ: I think so. Who has leverage: the lender, or the borrower? If you have $100 million dollars, everybody will beg you to do something. The creditors won’t want to ruin the relationship with you. I think that over the years the United States has lost some leverage, but there’s new leverage that appears. For example, the democratic forces within China have been growing rapidly in the past few years. They will exert tremendous pressure on the Chinese regime from the inside. That’s the leverage. China’s people are leverage.

China needs the United States in many ways. They’ve lent so much money to the United States that they don’t want to see the U.S. economy collapse. If they want economic development in China, they cannot cut off all communication, all the flows of capital to China. They just can’t close the door. Whatever happens, they have to listen, to a certain degree, to the voice of the international community, and the United States in particular.

FP: You recommend that the next U.S. president press China to hold local elections. How realistic is that possibility? What are the obstacles?

YJ: It is realistic because the central government may not be against it. The central government has taken pains to control governmental corruption, and it has already shown that it has no ability to do that. They need other forces to control the corruption. If the central government staged a serious campaign against corruption, so many officials—maybe 90 percent of party officials—[would be implicated] that the central government would collapse. They need some forces outside of the party system to help them deal with rampant local corruption. Local elections would help them in this endeavor.

FP: Do you think the world is giving China a free pass for the 2008 Beijing Games?

YJ: I think the international community has some regret in granting the opportunity to Beijing to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. In 2001, when China wanted the opportunity, it promised to improve the human rights situation in China, and many people believed them. Now, they’ve learned the lesson. I see the regret. But I still see the Olympics as an opportunity for us to do something, though it is difficult. I still want to urge people to take this opportunity to do something.

FP: Does it mean a boycott?

YJ: Not really. A boycott cannot be successful. No matter what you do, the Olympics are going to take place anyway. So my proposal is conditional participation. The idea is that when the Chinese authorities extend the invitation to you to go there, you bring up human rights. Then press the Chinese authorities to do something to facilitate your participation. For example, when President Bush accepted [President] Hu Jintao’s invitation, he said, “I will go to Beijing as a sports fan. I will not make any political statements.”

He accepted the invitation too easily, but I don’t think it’s too late. There is still time for him to say something like, “I would love to go to China to participate at the Olympic Games, but I want to see the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” or “I won’t go unless a dozen political prisoners directly related to the [Tiananmen] massacre are released.”

[The party leaders] want President Bush to be there. They want all the renowned athletes to be there to the help them showcase their achievements. They need them to be there. So, why don’t we do something?

FP: You yourself were held as a political prisoner for five years. What were the circumstances under which you were detained and the conditions in prison, and how did you hear you were going to be released?

YJ: I was blacklisted from entering China for my involvement in the 1989 student movement. I continued to work to advance democracy in China from the United States. In 2002, I entered China with another person’s passport—I tried to renew my own passport, but I was denied many times. At last I decided to go into China whatever way I could. I entered to observe labor unrest in northeast China. After two weeks, I was arrested at Kunming Airport while trying to leave the country. They sentenced me to five years on two charges: illegal entry and espionage.

The first half of my imprisonment was harsh. I was held for nearly 15 months in solitary confinement, in which I was denied any reading material, cut off from any meaningful human contact, and constantly subjected to both physical and psychological torture. A lot of that goes on. I did not know what was going on outside until my lawyer’s visit. I was greatly encouraged, though, to learn of the outpouring of support for me from outside China. After that, there were persecutions of different degrees, but gradually my situation improved because of the pressure of the international community. The U.S. Congress passed two resolutions on my behalf. The U.N. Human Rights Commission passed a resolution requesting my release, and many professors at Harvard and U.C. [the University of California], Berkeley, [where I received doctorates] wrote letters and petitions to Chinese authorities.

I was eventually transferred to another prison where I had greater freedom to interact with other inmates and the guards. I voluntarily taught my inmates English, economics, mathematics, logic. I actually wrote a textbook for logic in Chinese calligraphy and coached the basketball team for more than two years. Almost all the inmates called me “teacher,” and many guards became my friends. Thanks to their sympathy and protection, I was able to organize a Bible study group and helped baptize three inmates.

I was sentenced to five years, but everyone believed I would be released early because of the high-profile nature of my case. Late in the summer of 2006, the Chinese authorities offered me an early release. But they put on a condition that I had to leave China right away. They wouldn’t guarantee that I had a right to return in the future. My father died while I was in prison, and they would not allow me to return to my hometown to visit my father’s grave. So I didn’t accept the offer. They put me back in prison, and I actually served my full sentence.

FP: What are your plans going forward?

YJ: I’m going to open an office in Washington, D.C. [for the Foundation for China in the 21st Century] that will serve as a communications link between Chinese democracy forces and the outside world. We will provide a platform for dissidents and political activists back in China. They cannot communicate easily in China, and the Chinese authorities are very suspicious of organization of any kind. We will continue to advocate our cause internationally and also help the democratic forces in China do their work.

Yang Jianli is president of the U.S.-based Foundation for China in the 21st Century. In April 2007, he was released from prison in China after serving five years on political charges.

（http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4121）

Social unrest threatens Beijing Olympics

By QI GE

Published: January 09, 2008

A news program on China's state television station, CCTV, was suddenly interrupted when a woman appeared on camera to announce that her husband, the program's announcer, was having an affair. This unexpected incident occurred late last month during an announcement of CCTV's plan to rename its Sports Channel as the Olympic Channel. The husband was a well-known host of the Sports Channel, Zhang Bin, and his wife, Hu Ziwei, was also a television program host from another channel.

This interlude caused chaos for three minutes while the husband, along with several leaders and staff from CCTV, worked at persuading her to leave and pulling her off the set at the same time. The three-minute video was later spread widely on the Internet, where it attracted tremendous attention, humiliating both the station and the Chinese government.

In her tirade, Hu criticized China, saying it was far from becoming a real superpower and was neither qualified nor capable of hosting the Olympic Games.

"If the Chinese do not have … (interrupted by CCTV announcer) a sense of values, then what exact sense does all this make?" asked Hu. She accused her husband of being a hypocrite, with no sense of morality. Further, she quoted a French diplomat who reportedly said recently, "Not until China has a sense of values that can be accepted, recognized and praised will it become a great country."

Hu reportedly has been dismissed from her job and detained by the Beijing police, charged with "damaging the image of the Olympic Games." She may not be released until after the Games.

A rational examination of this incident reveals it is not just a matter of gossip, as it may superficially appear. Nor is it about a sense of values or the status of a great power. This incident is an example of growing social disorder connected with the Beijing Olympics, for which the authorities are unprepared.

This incident drew so much attention because it occurred as the news about the Olympic Channel was being announced, which is directly related to the Beijing Games, and it surprised people. People could not help but wonder if there will be more such outbreaks in the coming months, as the Games approach. If so, will they be more serious or have greater impact?

In the history of the Olympics, there have been three cases where the Games were hosted by divided nations: Munich, Seoul and Beijing this time. The horrific killing of Israeli athletes occurred at the 20th Games in Munich. A Korean airliner was blown up in midair before the 24th Games in Seoul. The later incident was directly related to political conflict due to the division of Korea.

This doesn't mean that being a divided state necessarily implies a risk of violence. However, as a divided state, China shares some similarities with the other two. How will relations across the Taiwan Strait develop? What will be the outcome of Taiwan's referendum to join the United Nations? In addition, divisive issues like Tibet, Xinjiang and China's democratic movement all pose potential risks ahead of the Games.

However, the things that truly agitate the people are those issues with "Chinese characteristics" -- rarely found in other countries but happening in China every single moment. Any one of them could lead to violent incidents or social turmoil.

Take the xinfang, or "letters and visits," system for example. This system allows ordinary people suffering from injustice to petition higher authorities for help. At least 400,000 people are currently using this system. Under the circumstances where there is no healthy legal system or disinterested judiciary, the xinfang system has became the solution with "Chinese characteristics," and the final hope for the masses at the bottom of society. As a result of this, the well-known "Xinfang Village" of petitioners sprouted in a Beijing suburb.

Beijing authorities tore down this improvised village by the end of last year, but did that solve the problem? Did the petitioners simply disappear? Certainly not. The potential for social unrest exists within this group, as every Chinese citizen will admit.

In addition, there are what the authorities call "mass incidents." Like the petitioners issue, they indicate a high risk of social breakdown. These incidents are caused mainly by laid-off workers and farmers deprived of their land in the process of urbanization and industrialization. The Hunyuan Incident was an example: Some 100,000 farmers in Hunyuan county of Sichuan province were deprived of their land and forced to move because of a hydropower project. Thousands of them protested the low compensation they received, in a "mass incident" in 2004. Other situations such as mine accidents are also counted as incidents of social disorder, which may cause trouble for the authorities.

All of these issues are unique to China and deeply rooted in the shortcomings of the current system of governance. They cannot be resolved in a single day. Can these hot potatoes be held down by iron arms? It was possible in the past but it is too difficult now.

The Olympic Games will bring hundreds of thousands of visitors from all over the world to China to witness its prosperity and great power, as well as 30,000 to 40,000 journalists from abroad. Once the guests have gathered, everything will be out in the open and cannot be controlled from within a black box.

Among the many journalists, more than 10,000 reporters with press passes will have the right to freely interview anyone with no need for official approval. This is another new problem for the leadership, which is used to tightly controlling the press. The last time a great number of foreign reporters came to China was in May, 1989, while former Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was visiting. At that time it was less than 2,000 foreign journalists.

Flattering the foreign and suppressing the domestic is China's political tradition. The Chinese government doesn't actually fear social unrest; it will always suppress it, whether it manifests in violent incidents or gradual movements. But the government cannot lose face by suppressing it in front of so many foreign guests.

Although the Chinese government has abundant experience in self-promotion by controlling the media, it is a greenhorn in coping with foreign media professionals who do not hesitate to criticize authorities. What is worse, the China government cannot just punish or dismiss foreign media professionals at will.

In fact, social disorder is not fearful and does not necessarily pose a risk to the state. The key to avoiding risk lies in the mindset of the authorities and their method of dealing with unrest. Take the current issues for instance: apparent inflation and superficial prosperity in the stock and housing markets. The number of people and amount of capital involved in the stock and housing markets is so huge that no one can deal with the turbulence once a serious problem finally occurs.

The Chinese government should be able to identify the real issues and rationally deal with them, and avoid actions that will spark greater social unrest. In this way they can effectively avoid incidents that might threaten the Beijing Olympics.

--
(Qi Ge is the pen name of a freelance writer based in Chengdu, Sichuan province. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online. The original may be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Qi Ge.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Society_Culture/2008/01/09/social_unrest_threatens_beijing_olympics/7303/

The Chinese passion for public office

ZHANG MING

BEIJING, China, Dec. 31

Many mainland Chinese are afflicted with empleomania -- an obsession with holding public office. This is demonstrated even in the sad story of a poor worker from the countryside named Xiao Zhijun.

The story was revealed by journalists investigating the deaths of Xiao's wife and her unborn baby in a Beijing hospital. Xiao went through a series of struggles with the hospital, which claimed he had refused to sign an agreement for an operation that could have saved his wife's and baby's lives. He claimed the hospital had not taken reasonable measures to save them.

But what was more surprising was that Xiao had concocted a story about being an official. He identified himself as belonging to the Organization Department of the Chinese Communist Party. Xiao's empleomania is ridiculous, but he isn't the only one.

It is certain that among Chinese farmers, throughout history, those who desired to hold public posts were more numerous than those who didn't. They lived frugally in order to afford education for their children, hoping the children might become officials.

Farmers always showed respect to the country squires and local scholars who might be closer to the authorities. In reality nowadays, many citizens criticize and deprecate officials behind their backs, but would not dare to fail to show respect if they met one of them face to face.

Unless the farmers are driven to craziness, they will not rebel against the authorities. Since modern China was established, rural societies have lost the little bit of autonomy they once had. Instead, the farmers feel the fearful power of the state and the government, which covers heaven and earth. Consequently, their enmity and envy toward officials are both increasing at the same time.

Farmers like Xiao Zejun can be seen everywhere. Ask the university students who come from the countryside and see how many of them do not desire a public post.

Being a politician may be seen as a glorious occupation in developed countries. However, only a small number of people follow this profession. There are many other appealing occupations in those societies, so few young people wish to become politicians. By comparison, being a civil servant is a quiet position. Although it is stable, it does not offer a satisfactory income or good reputation, so is not a top choice for young people in the job market.

Only in China is everyone in society crazy to take up a public position. Whenever there is an exam to recruit civil servants, every seat is taken by hopeful participants. Hundreds of applicants compete for a single easy job at a trade union, the United Front Work Department, and other official organizations.

Max Weber (1864-1920), recognized as one of the founders of modern sociology and public administration, once stated that officials in ancient China were the ones who made the most profits. Today his comment is still not out of date. Therefore so many people, including poor farmers and workers like Xiao Zhijun, dream of becoming officials. They are drawn by the perquisites, which include power and a psychological advantage over others.

The lowest public posts are the cadres at the county and town levels, while the positions that are hardly worthy of the name are found at the village level. In the rural areas such cadres are full of complaints, especially now that the agriculture tax has been abandoned. They complain about not receiving their salaries or allowances for six months, or one year or even several years. They may even be in tears.

But if you calm them down and observe them carefully, you'll find that most of these cadres are much better off than the local farmers. Moreover, regardless of their many duties and delayed payments, few of them quit their jobs. It is because they can hold onto power as long as they have a public post, at whatever level.

In such a society with its culture of officials, it is not surprising that even a poor farmer dreams of being an official.

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(Zhang Ming is a professor and supervisor of doctoral students at the School of International Relations of the People's University of China in Beijing. He has a PhD in politics, and is the former dean of the Politics Department at People's University. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online. The original may be found at www.ncn.org and zhangming.vip.bokee.com ©Copyright Zhang Ming.)

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