North Korea's hidden nuclear programs

By FANG JUE
Published: July 14, 2008 

New York, NY, United States, — The sixth round of six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear programs took place from July 10 to 12 in Beijing, with all parties agreeing that positive progress had been made. The six nations – China, North Korea, Japan, South Korea, Russia and the United States – issued a joint press communiqué at the end of the meeting, stating that the progress made in this second phase of implementing the Joint Statement agreed in September, 2005, would contribute to peace and stability in Northeast Asia.

The press communiqué carried little substantial content and there are several critical problems it did not address.

First of all, the purpose of this meeting was to discuss verification of North Korea's denuclearization. But it avoided the most significant issue – specifying what exactly is to be verified. North Korean's nuclear development involves both plutonium and uranium.

North Korea has generated several kilograms of weapons-grade plutonium and has produced several dirty bombs using plutonium. One such bomb was used for an underground nuclear test in October of 2006.

The verification activities discussed at the six-party meeting only referred to the quantity of plutonium produced, and the facilities where it has been produced. They did not include the dirty bombs, nor did they include uranium. In other words, they dealt with only half of North Korean's nuclear programs. Can such an approach to verification bring about North Korea's denuclearization?

Secondly, this meeting basically excluded the U.N. International Atomic Energy Agency, the main international organization responsible for overseeing and inspecting nuclear activities of all countries, from verifying North Korea's nuclear development. Instead, the press communiqué said only that the IAEA would be welcome to provide consultation and assistance in the task of verification, if necessary.

This makes the verification issue a matter of bargaining among a few countries, rather than an issue of objective international supervision and inspection. And it deprives the IAEA of its conventional role and responsibility. Without the participation of the IAEA, the verification process appears random, uncertain and lacking in international credibility.

Thirdly, the principle of consensus based on negotiations among the six counties was emphasized in the press communiqué. "The specific plans and implementation of the verification will be decided by the Working Group on Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in line with the principle of consensus," it claimed. This principle implies that a decision on verification can only be achieved when all the six parties, including North Korea itself, agree.

North Korea, as a participant in the six-party talks, formerly refused to allow international verification of its programs. Now it appears it will allow verification of half its programs – those based on plutonium – and their production facilities. Yet it will likely continue to create new difficulties, ask for new rewards and offer new excuses for delaying the implementation of plans to verify its activities.

If the verification is to be expanded to other areas – the plutonium dirty bombs and the field of uranium – it will be hard to reach "consensus" with North Korea. Does a failure to reach consensus with North Korea mean it can maintain its current bombs and its uranium program in secret, so that it can possess dirty bombs made with uranium in the future?

In brief, it is inappropriate to adopt the principle of "consensus" in dealing with North Korea's denuclearization. On the contrary, it is obligatory to thoroughly examine all areas of nuclear development in North Korea in order to realize denuclearization. Without coercion, it will remain a country of nuclear weapons, of nuclear expansion, of blackmail for nuclear development and China's partner in nuclearization.

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(Fang Jue is a political activist and freelance writer living in the United States. He was a former government official in China and worked at the Politics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He was a visiting scholar at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University in 2003. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original can be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Fang Jue.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Security/2008/07/14/north_koreas_hidden_nuclear_programs/5459/

Phony yuan endangers Beijing Olympics

By Zhu Jianguo

Published: July 03, 2008

Shenzhen, China — Less than 50 days before the Beijing Olympics open in August, an official from China's southeastern province of Guangdong announced that the People's Bank of China may be circulating counterfeit banknotes. This sent shockwaves around China, as what was supposed to be China's Olympic heyday was suddenly threatened by a possible scandal over fake money.

This could turn into a disaster to rival the previous ones that have struck China this year – the heavy snowstorm in southern China in January, the riots in Tibet in March, the train collision in Shandong in April, the earthquake in Sichuan in May and the rainstorms that flooded nine southern provinces in June.

Kuang Guojian, vice president of the Guangdong branch of the People's Bank of China, told the media on June 18 he could not guarantee that the bank would not circulate any counterfeit notes. The People's Bank of China oversees all financial institutions and banks in the country.

Most people tend to believe that fake money circulates only through black market channels, despite recent news reports that local bank officials are suspected of collusion in making and selling counterfeit notes. The Guangdong police department has announced that several officials are suspected of involvement in the production and circulation of nearly 600 million yuan (US$87 million) in fake notes. From time to time the media have reported that ATMs have issued fake 100-yuan bills; still, the public tends to view these as isolated illegal incidents related only to specific banks.

Kuang, a government official at the level of commissioner, explained that if a customer discovered that a bank had issued counterfeit notes he or she could "simply go to the counter to ask for genuine money instead." The bank seemed to be justifying the circulation of fake notes as a legitimate error, rather than offering to compensate the customers or even apologize to them.

Kuang said no bank would intentionally circulate counterfeit money. If a bank were found to be intentionally involved in counterfeiting, there would be severe punishment, he added. Yet he asked the public to be on the alert for counterfeit bills.

The bank official not only tried to shift responsibility for checking banknotes onto the customers, but also blamed criminals for mixing fake notes with real ones in the banks' ATM machines. "The machines are not without risk," he admitted.

In light of the corruption of many bank presidents and personnel, many of whom are currently serving time in jail, Kuang's confidence in the bank is not very persuasive.

It's not easy to determine if Kuang's statements – exonerating the bank from blame in illegally circulating fake money and shifting the responsibility onto others – were his own invention or whether they were authorized by a higher authority. Certainly Kuang did not receive any censure from higher authorities after making these statements.

The provincial Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party long ago announced that it was the duty of Party members to diligently fight against the counterfeiting of money. Now that Kuang has dared to legitimize the banks' crime in circulating phony money, doesn't his action make the regulation a fake too?

Meanwhile, it is odd that the Chinese government has dedicated itself to fighting the counterfeiting of ordinary products and services throughout the years, yet it cannot guarantee the authenticity of the state currency, the most critical commodity in the country, circulated by state banks.

If fake yuan can appear in banks all over China without arousing serious concerns, can the guests and athletes coming from all over the world be at ease during their visits to Beijing during the Olympics next month? As for Chinese citizens, they may all be busy checking their banknotes, leaving no time to applaud the opening of the Games.

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(Zhu Jianguo is a freelance writer and an independent researcher on "pseudo modernization," as well as a former journalist and editor. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese; the original can be found at www.chinaeweekly.com ©Copyright Zhu Jianguo)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Economics/2008/07/03/phony_yuan_endangers_beijing_olympics/9844/

Ethnic discrimination in China

By William Schue

July 10, 2008

 

Beijing, China ― The date, June 28, on which a riot occurred in the county of Wengan in southwestern China appeared to have a mysterious connection with the date, March 14, on which riots broke out in the city of Lhasa in Tibet. In Chinese, where months are expressed as numbers, the former is exactly twice the latter. There were many similarities between the two events as well.

For many Chinese, who are sensitive to numbers and the invisible arrangements of destiny, this was more than a simple coincidence.

Both incidents involved group violence in which ordinary citizens fought against armed police or soldiers. And in both cases, the authorities adopted the same official line, accusing the common people of initiating the violence.

There were also critical differences between the two incidents in the minds of the Chinese public, however. Lhasa is a famous city while Wengan is an unknown county. They also involved people of different races, therefore the attitudes of Chinese citizens toward these two riots were different.

It is difficult for state-controlled media to report real public opinion, as they are only tools to propagate the official viewpoint. Chinese netizens' postings on major online forums like Tianya and Cat898.com, however, reveal public opinion to some degree. An examination of online remarks shows that a majority of netizens supported the government and objected to the riots by ethnic Tibetans, while many supported the riot by ethnic Chinese in Wengan who were fighting against the government.

The Wengan riot was only 105 days after the Lhasa riot. Both locations are remote from well-developed areas, so the "truth" of what happened in both cases was subject to blocks and manipulation by the authorities.

Under these very similar circumstances, why did netizens, lacking firsthand information, hold completely opposite attitudes toward these two incidents where common people became involved in acts of violence? If the Tibetan people were blamed for the outbreak of violence, why were the people of Wengan, in the same situation, afforded understanding and sympathy?

If sympathy for the weak inspired the majority of Chinese to stand with the people of Wengan, why did so few people show similar sympathy for the powerless Tibetans? Why did the majority groundlessly consider the people of Wengan innocent while assuming the Tibetans were guilty?

The netizens' attitudes demonstrate a double standard in view of the facts. Ethnicity matters, and is one of the factors that influence general public attitudes.

The majority of Chinese netizens belong to the "great Han people," including the original Han Chinese ethnic group and other ethnic groups that have been assimilated by the Han.

The ideology of political power based in the central plains of China and nationalism have impacted the "great Han people." These factors have shaped the thinking of the Han people and have also alienated China's other races. In the eyes of many Han people, the ethnic minorities in their conventional costumes are viewed as having violent tendencies, uncivilized ways and uneducated minds.

Hence, the Han rulers were strengthened in their ancient idea � "Let those who comply with me thrive and those who resist me perish."

In China, the people who are most discriminated against are not those from small minority groups, but those whose populations are sizeable, who inhabit remote regions and hold unique religious beliefs, and are therefore unable to easily assimilate to the Han lifestyle, customs, racial characteristics and culture. These include the Tibetans, the Hui and the Uygurs. Their obviously different racial characteristics are an everlasting pain for the "great Han people," who insist on being extremely conceited.

The Tibetan people in Lhasa were fighting against oppression by authorities who represent the interests of the great Han people. Their actions in the March 14 riot were therefore demonized by the Han people. In the June 28 incident, however, when citizens of the "great Han people" conflicted with the Han authorities in their appeal for justice, this was viewed as an internal conflict, so they could win sympathy and support.

Although it is true that some individuals among the ethnic minorities engage in lawless conduct such as stealing, beating people, and so on, such tales are often magnified so the image of the whole group is tainted. On the other hand, news media often avoid covering social issues involving ethnic minorities for fear of arousing and expanding ethnic conflicts. That unfortunately leads to ethnic issues remaining underground.

Ignorance of real information leads to the spread of rumors, and unfounded rumors about China's ethnic minorities influence and prejudice the views of the Han people. Consequently, ethnic discrimination in China cannot be freely discussed.

The unwillingness of political authorities and the news media to face this issue means the entire Chinese people neglect the issue of ethnic discrimination. Although discrimination rarely surfaces among those working within the state system, and few people would consider themselves prejudiced, these attitudes are hidden in the minds of many great Han people. As soon as an incident like the March 14 riot in Lhasa occurs, this tendency is stirred up.

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(William Schue is a freelance writer with a background in law and journalism. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese; the original can be found at www.ncn.org and williamschue007cn.spaces.live.com. ©Copyright William Schue.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Society_Culture/2008/07/10/ethnic_discrimination_in_china/8663/