Wei Jingsheng decries US' PNTR trade treatment for Communist China

An open letter to Democratic presidential candidates
(Hillary Clinton, Barack Obama)

Source: Wei Jingsheng Foundation

February, 2008

I am grateful to the two candidates of the Democratic Party of the USA. Finally, you have included the important issues of millions of American workers' jobs in your campaign agenda.

Seven years ago, during the hot debate over whether to give China Permanent Normal Trade Relationship (PNTR) or not, it was the then US representatives David Bonior (D, MI), Nancy Pelosi (D, CA), Marcy Kaptur (D, OH), Sherrod Brown (D, OH), Frank Wolf (R, VA) and Chris Smith (R, NJ) who stood on the frontline against offering the dictatorial Communist China PNTR and entrance into the World Trade Organizations (WTO). They were defending human rights, as well as protecting American workers' interests and Chinese workers' rights. Most of democratic politicians were on their side, but the majority of American politicians stood on the side of the dictatorial Chinese government. We failed in this battle.

The result of this failure is that not only did Chinese workers lose their opportunity of striving for their legitimate rights and reasonable treatment, but also millions of Americans lost their job opportunities and their fight for reasonable treatment as well. Eight years ago, we had already warned Americans that giving PNTR to the Chinese Communists would damage the rights and interests of the American workers and the Chinese workers, as well as damage the interests of the small and middle sized business enterprises in America, further damaging America's market and America's national interest. At that time, 70% of Americans already realized this problem, but less than half of American politicians admitted this problem.

For 7 years now, this problem has rapidly developed in the form of economic recession and the way that millions lost their jobs. If we include Europe and Japan, it is an unemployment of tens of millions of people and global economic recession. From an international political view, it is the global recession of human rights and democratic politics, and the new rise of an "evil axis". While American soldiers are risking their lives for democracy and human rights, American politicians and big business enterprises are raising money to help the evil axis that has the behind-the-scenes backing of the Chinese Communist government. This irrational state has come to the point that it must be corrected.

I am grateful to the candidates of the Democratic Party who raised this grave problem to a point of urgency. On the most important timetable for the US president to work, this problem is the one that should have the first priority. It is the root problem behind all the other important problems. Regardless of who will be elected for the next term as the US president, if he/she is sincere in defending the interests of the Americans, as well as the free and democratic countries, he/she must solve this problem first, to correct the root mistakes that the past American government had made.

WEI Jingsheng

Overseas Chinese Democracy Coalition

What America Must Do: Yang Jianli

Posted January 2008

Yang Jianli spent five years in a Chinese prison on political charges. He tells FP why he believes some American policymakers are hypocrites when it comes to China and what he hopes President Bush will say at the Beijing Games.

	Related to this article: What America Must Do The China Syndrome By Yang Jianli Author Interviews: Kenneth Rogoff Reza Aslan Dmitri Trenin Jessica T. Mathews For additional Web extras from the January/February 2008 issue of FP, click here.

Foreign Policy: How has U.S. policy toward China over the past decade been inconsistent, as you argue in your article?

Yang Jianli: I’ll give you two examples: Bill Clinton, in his 1992 campaign, criticized the [George H.W.] Bush administration for its soft stance against the Chinese communist regime right after the [Tiananmen] massacre. [Clinton] vowed to stand firmly on human rights issues when dealing with China. But he didn’t stick to what he promised, which was a surprise and dismay to my colleagues in the dissident community. In 1994, he suddenly delinked human rights issues from trade, a stand that turned out to be even softer than the Bush administration’s. And in 2001, again, the United States allowed China’s accession to the WTO [World Trade Organization] without almost any human rights conditions. That’s what I mean by inconsistent. It’s about credibility. If you always change whatever position you take, whether wrong to right or right to wrong, then the other party knows that you are changeable. Whenever it comes to a serious issue, they will press you to change, not themselves.

FP: You also argue that some academics are hypocrites in their stance toward China. In what sense?

YJ: They have a self-imposed censorship and fear because they try very hard to compete with one another for access to the top Chinese leaders. They are afraid that if they are outspoken and criticize the regime, opportunities to go to China will disappear. But there are very clear scholarly principles and standards: to be impartial, to be objective. And they have given them up for these opportunities.

China cannot go backward to the old days, the dark days with the door closed to the outside world. They cannot do it. The Chinese regime, like its predecessors, is increasingly worried about its international image. They will still allow [these academics] to enter China to do their studies because they need them for their image. So, why the self-censorship?

FP: Given the fact that China holds so much U.S. debt, do you believe the United States still has the kind of leverage it used to with China?

YJ: I think so. Who has leverage: the lender, or the borrower? If you have $100 million dollars, everybody will beg you to do something. The creditors won’t want to ruin the relationship with you. I think that over the years the United States has lost some leverage, but there’s new leverage that appears. For example, the democratic forces within China have been growing rapidly in the past few years. They will exert tremendous pressure on the Chinese regime from the inside. That’s the leverage. China’s people are leverage.

China needs the United States in many ways. They’ve lent so much money to the United States that they don’t want to see the U.S. economy collapse. If they want economic development in China, they cannot cut off all communication, all the flows of capital to China. They just can’t close the door. Whatever happens, they have to listen, to a certain degree, to the voice of the international community, and the United States in particular.

FP: You recommend that the next U.S. president press China to hold local elections. How realistic is that possibility? What are the obstacles?

YJ: It is realistic because the central government may not be against it. The central government has taken pains to control governmental corruption, and it has already shown that it has no ability to do that. They need other forces to control the corruption. If the central government staged a serious campaign against corruption, so many officials—maybe 90 percent of party officials—[would be implicated] that the central government would collapse. They need some forces outside of the party system to help them deal with rampant local corruption. Local elections would help them in this endeavor.

FP: Do you think the world is giving China a free pass for the 2008 Beijing Games?

YJ: I think the international community has some regret in granting the opportunity to Beijing to host the 2008 Summer Olympics. In 2001, when China wanted the opportunity, it promised to improve the human rights situation in China, and many people believed them. Now, they’ve learned the lesson. I see the regret. But I still see the Olympics as an opportunity for us to do something, though it is difficult. I still want to urge people to take this opportunity to do something.

FP: Does it mean a boycott?

YJ: Not really. A boycott cannot be successful. No matter what you do, the Olympics are going to take place anyway. So my proposal is conditional participation. The idea is that when the Chinese authorities extend the invitation to you to go there, you bring up human rights. Then press the Chinese authorities to do something to facilitate your participation. For example, when President Bush accepted [President] Hu Jintao’s invitation, he said, “I will go to Beijing as a sports fan. I will not make any political statements.”

He accepted the invitation too easily, but I don’t think it’s too late. There is still time for him to say something like, “I would love to go to China to participate at the Olympic Games, but I want to see the ratification of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,” or “I won’t go unless a dozen political prisoners directly related to the [Tiananmen] massacre are released.”

[The party leaders] want President Bush to be there. They want all the renowned athletes to be there to the help them showcase their achievements. They need them to be there. So, why don’t we do something?

FP: You yourself were held as a political prisoner for five years. What were the circumstances under which you were detained and the conditions in prison, and how did you hear you were going to be released?

YJ: I was blacklisted from entering China for my involvement in the 1989 student movement. I continued to work to advance democracy in China from the United States. In 2002, I entered China with another person’s passport—I tried to renew my own passport, but I was denied many times. At last I decided to go into China whatever way I could. I entered to observe labor unrest in northeast China. After two weeks, I was arrested at Kunming Airport while trying to leave the country. They sentenced me to five years on two charges: illegal entry and espionage.

The first half of my imprisonment was harsh. I was held for nearly 15 months in solitary confinement, in which I was denied any reading material, cut off from any meaningful human contact, and constantly subjected to both physical and psychological torture. A lot of that goes on. I did not know what was going on outside until my lawyer’s visit. I was greatly encouraged, though, to learn of the outpouring of support for me from outside China. After that, there were persecutions of different degrees, but gradually my situation improved because of the pressure of the international community. The U.S. Congress passed two resolutions on my behalf. The U.N. Human Rights Commission passed a resolution requesting my release, and many professors at Harvard and U.C. [the University of California], Berkeley, [where I received doctorates] wrote letters and petitions to Chinese authorities.

I was eventually transferred to another prison where I had greater freedom to interact with other inmates and the guards. I voluntarily taught my inmates English, economics, mathematics, logic. I actually wrote a textbook for logic in Chinese calligraphy and coached the basketball team for more than two years. Almost all the inmates called me “teacher,” and many guards became my friends. Thanks to their sympathy and protection, I was able to organize a Bible study group and helped baptize three inmates.

I was sentenced to five years, but everyone believed I would be released early because of the high-profile nature of my case. Late in the summer of 2006, the Chinese authorities offered me an early release. But they put on a condition that I had to leave China right away. They wouldn’t guarantee that I had a right to return in the future. My father died while I was in prison, and they would not allow me to return to my hometown to visit my father’s grave. So I didn’t accept the offer. They put me back in prison, and I actually served my full sentence.

FP: What are your plans going forward?

YJ: I’m going to open an office in Washington, D.C. [for the Foundation for China in the 21st Century] that will serve as a communications link between Chinese democracy forces and the outside world. We will provide a platform for dissidents and political activists back in China. They cannot communicate easily in China, and the Chinese authorities are very suspicious of organization of any kind. We will continue to advocate our cause internationally and also help the democratic forces in China do their work.

Yang Jianli is president of the U.S.-based Foundation for China in the 21st Century. In April 2007, he was released from prison in China after serving five years on political charges.

（http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4121）

China should learn civilized diplomacy

FANG JUE

NEW YORK, Dec. 1

China's refusal to allow the USS Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier group to berth in Hong Kong for Thanksgiving Day was a misunderstanding, Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi reportedly told U.S. President George W. Bush during a phone call on Nov. 27.

This is an excuse from the highest leadership. The incident, in fact, was not a case of misunderstanding but a purposeful action.

A China-U.S. agreement had been reached several months earlier that the USS Kitty Hawk would be allowed to visit Hong Kong from Nov. 21 to 24 during the U.S. Thanksgiving holiday. On Nov. 21, one day before Thanksgiving, when the carrier group with 8,000 sailors was approaching Hong Kong, the U.S. side was suddenly informed by Chinese authorities that there was "no approval for the berthing." Moreover, the Chinese side refused to offer an explanation for this unilateral, last-minute decision.

The planned berthing was not for military purposes but merely an arrangement for the sailors to celebrate a holiday. Thanksgiving Day isn't even a political holiday, like the U.S. Independence Day on July 4. It is a civilian holiday when families get together with their loved ones once a year, similar to the Lunar New Year's Day for the Chinese.

On this U.S. holiday, according to the original arrangement between the two sides, U.S. troops stationed overseas would be granted an opportunity to meet their family members, many of whom had flown to Hong Kong for the occasion. It was a perfect embodiment of President Hu Jintao's slogans advocating "people oriented" leadership and a "harmonious society."

However, the real practice was neither people-oriented nor conducive of harmony. The result was that the U.S. sailors could not meet their family members, after nearly 300 of them had spent their own money to fly to Hong Kong. The aircraft carrier was forced to return to its base in Japan.

The Chinese government has accumulated a list of complaints against the United States over certain issues in recent years. The list reflects long-term differences between China and the United States. However, long-term differences must be resolved in the long run, and should not be reflected in the treatment of regular U.S. troops and their innocent family members.

There is no honor or credit in this kind of erratic behavior. Using a situation like this as a pretext for high-flown talk and beating about the bush is a reflection of Cold War mentality. It is not civilized diplomacy.

Actually, China displayed the same Cold War approach a few days earlier, when two U.S. minesweepers encountered a storm in international waters and requested permission to shelter and refuel in Hong Kong. But China turned down this request. As a result, the two minesweepers had to refuel from a U.S. tanker and fight the storm on their own until they could leave the area.

It is common practice between countries that are not at war that if the navy of one country requests help from the other in an emergency, the help should be given as far as possible. However, the Chinese government completely ignored this civilized rule based on humanitarian concerns.

The Chinese Navy has carried out joint exercises at sea with the U.S. Navy more than once. However, when the U.S. ships faced a real danger, the Chinese refused to give them a hand. This resembles the situation between the Soviet Union and the United States during the Cold War, when the USSR took every opportunity to make things difficult for the United States.

Hu Jintao, who is not only head of state but also chairman of the Central Military Commission, must be the person responsible for this Cold War approach. No other individual or institution would have the authority to give such an order, not even the Chinese Navy or the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

It appears necessary to remind Chairman Hu of the fact that times have changed. The Cold War ended more than 16 years ago.

If the Chinese government has anything to discuss with its U.S. counterpart, there are proper channels for communication and negotiation. There is no need to play little tricks to make up for the lack of a big stick. Gamesmanship without actual strength will have no impact. If China has no big stick to wield, it might consider trying civilized diplomacy.

--

(Fang Jue is a political activist and freelance writer living in the United States. He was a former government official in China and worked at the Politics Research Institute of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. He was a visiting scholar at the Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research at Harvard University in 2003. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original can be found at www.chinaeweekly.com. ©Copyright Fang Jue.)

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/Politics/2007/12/01/commentary_china_should_learn_civilized_diplomacy/1668/

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations (Part 2)

WU JIAXIANG

BEIJING, Jul. 17

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/politics/2007/07/17/commentary_the_evolution_of_sinous_relations_part_2/

Sino-U.S. relations hit a great reef in June 1989 when the Tiananmen Square incident occurred. This reef would have appeared sooner or later anyway. When a great democratic nation and a totalitarian regime approach one another, they will eventually discover the gulf between them. This is the gulf of values and the belief in liberty and democracy.

Although one may say that the Tiananmen Square incident was China's internal affair, the Chinese government's actions contradicted the U.S. belief in human rights as a universal value, so the United States unavoidably imposed sanctions on China. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was very aware of this point and did not want to worsen relations with the United States.

Nevertheless, the Tiananmen Square incident and resulting U.S. sanctions were not a real crisis in relations between the two countries. An even greater crisis occurred during the Kosovo War in May 1999, when the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by NATO forces. We cannot simply explain this as an accident or mistaken target. In fact, this incident was related to the changing geopolitical situation and also a shift in the regime in China.

After the 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1997, China's overall power was enhanced remarkably. Jiang Zemin's power was consolidated at that congress, the centralization of power in the hands of one individual reaching its highest point in Communist Party history. This gave Jiang the illusion that he had become the leader of a world-class great nation.

However, Jiang also felt that the ideological foundations of the Chinese Communist Party were collapsing. In the eyes of some CCP thinkers, nationalism was a possible substitute for communist ideology. To challenge the U.S.-led NATO forces during the Kosovo War would demonstrate the "hero quality" of the leader of a great nation and stir up the patriotism and nationalism of the Chinese people.

But the nature of Chinese society had already changed -- from a totalitarian society to an authoritarian society. Confronting the United States would damage the country's economic growth. This would not benefit the capitalist children of the high-level leaders or the new middle class. These people, who were becoming the dominant group in Chinese society, would not approve of an anti-U.S. policy.

Some college students demonstrated against the Belgrade bombing at the U.S. Embassy in the morning, and were standing in line to register for the TOEFL English language test in the afternoon. This is a vivid portrayal of Chinese society at that time, and indicates the difficulty of maintaining a policy of conflict with the United States.

The current CCP leadership inherited the social and political structure of the Jiang period but did not inherit the centralization of power on one individual. This is good news for Sino-U.S. relations. First, traces of totalitarianism are gradually being eliminated from the regime as China moves through authoritarianism toward a more free society.

Regarding ideology, neither Marxism nor nationalism can be the basis of the ruling party's legitimacy. The Three Represents theory adopted at the 16th CCP Congress (that the Party represents advanced productive forces, advanced culture and the broad masses of the people) demonstrates that the government has realized its current legitimacy rests on economic growth. The United States has the greatest impact on China's economic growth; therefore good Sino-U.S. relations are one element on which the Party's legitimacy depends.

Secondly, the highest decision-making power of the CCP is once again distributed among several leaders, which will cause another round of competition for power. The strategy of the leading group to strengthen its rule is to continue economic reforms and win public support. Deng Xiaoping established unsurpassed authority through reforms, which encourages the current leaders to imitate his practice. Once reforms move to the political sphere, China and the United States will draw closer in political values. The development of Sino-U.S. relations is directly related to China's internal reforms.

Thirdly, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong, the key figures among the current leadership, all grew up during the Deng Xiaoping reform period. Hu and Wen were trained and promoted by former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, and looked after by Deng. It is more than a guess to predict that they will maintain a friendly policy toward the United States.

Finally, a number of CCP leaders have sent their children or other relatives to the United States to study, work or become U.S. citizens, which is an invisible link sustaining Sino-U.S. relations.

In brief, further liberation of Chinese society will reduce the value differences between China and the United States. Dependence on economic growth will sustain China's need for the United States. And the decentralization of high-level power will push China's political reforms. Under the fourth generation leadership, all these things have already taken place, are taking place now, or will take place. Therefore, in conclusion, the consolidation of the fourth generation of CCP leadership means that Sino-U.S. relations will enter their best period since the CCP came to power in mainland China.

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(Wu Jiaxiang is a renowned economic and political scholar and a former visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research. His research covers economics, domestic and international politics, business strategy, and Chinese traditional strategy and thought. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original was published in "Trends" magazine of May 2007 and can be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Wu Jiaxiang.)

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations (Part 1)

WU JIAXIANG

BEIJING, Jul. 16

http://www.upiasiaonline.com/politics/2007/07/16/commentary_the_evolution_of_sinous_relations_part_1/

Sino-U.S. relations are at their best since the Chinese Communist Party came to power in mainland China. This is mainly because China, under the "fourth generation" leadership, has evolved to the point where it needs the United States more than the United States needs China. Also, the United States protects rather than threatens China's security. In other words, a peaceful international environment led by the United States is more beneficial for China than a geopolitical environment in which several powers compete for hegemony.

The CCP regime has evolved through three phases from the time the Party, under Mao Zedong, took control of mainland China in 1949 to the time the fourth generation leadership, under Hu Jintao, took over in November 2002. It is now at the beginning of a fourth phase.

The first phase was a period of dictatorship under Mao Zedong. The second was a transitional oligarchic regime led by Deng Xiaoping, whose economic reforms transformed the ruling power from a dictatorship to an authoritarian state. The third phase was an authoritarian dictatorship under Jiang Zemin, who centralized power even more than Mao did, taking charge of the Party, the military, the economy, diplomacy and the Taiwan issue. This dispersed the power of the government and placed the highest authority in the hands of one individual. The fourth phase is an authoritarian oligarchy, in which the highest authority is shared between the third and fourth generation leadership of the CCP.

Leadership of the communist regime has changed three times, each change resulting in greater decentralization of power. During the Jiang Zemin period, even though a dictatorship was restored for a short time, the state relinquished much of its power over the economy, society and culture. Understanding this point is important, as the decentralization of power was part of the process of China's rapprochement with the United States.

Weak nations have no diplomatic influence; neither do dictatorships. Dictatorial regimes focus on enemies and external threats, enabling them to eliminate freedoms within the country and seek temporary alliances with other nations due to a perceived common enemy.

China under Mao, therefore, had no real allies. It had only temporary "partners" who shared its enemies. Mao's ally was the Soviet Union, while he saw the United States, which fought the Korean War and the Vietnam War on China's borders, as the greatest threat to China's security. However, when he saw that the Soviet Union intended to expand its territory, Mao began to relax his hostility toward the United States and sought an "alliance" with Washington in order to contain the Soviet Union, his previous ally.

This geopolitical change shifted Sino-U.S. relations during Mao's rule, but the relationship remained unstable, temporary and passive. The opponent of an enemy is not necessary a reliable ally -- as demonstrated in the relationship between the United States and Iraq.

Although a democratic country may not necessarily be the natural ally of another democratic country, two countries that are extremely opposite in terms of ideology, values and political systems -- such as China under Mao and the United States in the first half of the Nixon administration -- are most likely to be natural enemies. The more totalitarian and dictatorial a regime is, the greater its potential for conflict with the United States. It is likely to become a U.S. enemy unless there is an even greater enemy who can temporarily unite the two. This is not a solution to the conflict, but merely its postponement.

One of the main reasons China had no violent conflict with the United States, as did Iraq, is that China switched to an authoritarian regime under Deng Xiaoping. The dictatorship was replaced by an oligarchy. At this time, China needed aid from the Western camp more than from the Eastern camp. It needed the United States more than any other country in order to implement its economic reforms and transform from a planned economy to a market economy. It needed expertise on how to run a market economy, as well as technology, capital and personnel from the West.

In a sense, China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979, guided by Deng, was a warning to the Soviet Union and an olive branch to the United States. During the two years from January 1978 to December 1979, Deng received ten delegations of U.S. politicians, business leaders and media experts, to whom he expressed his wish to improve relations with the United States. In addition, he visited the United States from Jan. 29 to Feb. 5, 1979 -- the first time a Chinese leader visited the United States since the founding of the People's Republic of China. By contrast, during the same period Deng did not receive any guests from the Soviet Union, let alone visit the country.

Internal Chinese politics also affected Deng's preference for the United States and neglect of the Soviet Union. Decision-making power was shared at the time by Deng's pro-reform group and that of the conservative Chen Yun. While Deng advocated the U.S.-style market economy, Chen lobbied for a Soviet-style planned economy. As the conservatives had no effective international support after the Sino-Soviet relationship went cold, decision-making power naturally went to the reformists.

It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev took office and pushed his reform policies that Deng began to show an interest in improving relations with Moscow. By this time China was beginning to succeed in its domestic reforms and the Soviet Union, with its new policy orientation, was unlikely to support the conservatives in the Chinese Communist Party.

(To be continued)

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(Wu Jiaxiang is a renowned economic and political scholar and a former visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research. His research covers economics, domestic and international politics, business strategy, and Chinese traditional strategy and thought. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original was published in "Trends" magazine of May 2007 and may be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Wu Jiaxiang.)