BEIJING, Jul. 16
Sino-U.S. relations are at their best since the Chinese Communist Party came to power in mainland China. This is mainly because China, under the "fourth generation" leadership, has evolved to the point where it needs the United States more than the United States needs China. Also, the United States protects rather than threatens China's security. In other words, a peaceful international environment led by the United States is more beneficial for China than a geopolitical environment in which several powers compete for hegemony.
The CCP regime has evolved through three phases from the time the Party, under Mao Zedong, took control of mainland China in 1949 to the time the fourth generation leadership, under Hu Jintao, took over in November 2002. It is now at the beginning of a fourth phase.
The first phase was a period of dictatorship under Mao Zedong. The second was a transitional oligarchic regime led by Deng Xiaoping, whose economic reforms transformed the ruling power from a dictatorship to an authoritarian state. The third phase was an authoritarian dictatorship under Jiang Zemin, who centralized power even more than Mao did, taking charge of the Party, the military, the economy, diplomacy and the Taiwan issue. This dispersed the power of the government and placed the highest authority in the hands of one individual. The fourth phase is an authoritarian oligarchy, in which the highest authority is shared between the third and fourth generation leadership of the CCP.
Leadership of the communist regime has changed three times, each change resulting in greater decentralization of power. During the Jiang Zemin period, even though a dictatorship was restored for a short time, the state relinquished much of its power over the economy, society and culture. Understanding this point is important, as the decentralization of power was part of the process of China's rapprochement with the United States.
Weak nations have no diplomatic influence; neither do dictatorships. Dictatorial regimes focus on enemies and external threats, enabling them to eliminate freedoms within the country and seek temporary alliances with other nations due to a perceived common enemy.
China under Mao, therefore, had no real allies. It had only temporary "partners" who shared its enemies. Mao's ally was the Soviet Union, while he saw the United States, which fought the Korean War and the Vietnam War on China's borders, as the greatest threat to China's security. However, when he saw that the Soviet Union intended to expand its territory, Mao began to relax his hostility toward the United States and sought an "alliance" with Washington in order to contain the Soviet Union, his previous ally.
This geopolitical change shifted Sino-U.S. relations during Mao's rule, but the relationship remained unstable, temporary and passive. The opponent of an enemy is not necessary a reliable ally -- as demonstrated in the relationship between the United States and Iraq.
Although a democratic country may not necessarily be the natural ally of another democratic country, two countries that are extremely opposite in terms of ideology, values and political systems -- such as China under Mao and the United States in the first half of the Nixon administration -- are most likely to be natural enemies. The more totalitarian and dictatorial a regime is, the greater its potential for conflict with the United States. It is likely to become a U.S. enemy unless there is an even greater enemy who can temporarily unite the two. This is not a solution to the conflict, but merely its postponement.
One of the main reasons China had no violent conflict with the United States, as did Iraq, is that China switched to an authoritarian regime under Deng Xiaoping. The dictatorship was replaced by an oligarchy. At this time, China needed aid from the Western camp more than from the Eastern camp. It needed the United States more than any other country in order to implement its economic reforms and transform from a planned economy to a market economy. It needed expertise on how to run a market economy, as well as technology, capital and personnel from the West.
In a sense, China's brief war with Vietnam in 1979, guided by Deng, was a warning to the Soviet Union and an olive branch to the United States. During the two years from January 1978 to December 1979, Deng received ten delegations of U.S. politicians, business leaders and media experts, to whom he expressed his wish to improve relations with the United States. In addition, he visited the United States from Jan. 29 to Feb. 5, 1979 -- the first time a Chinese leader visited the United States since the founding of the People's Republic of China. By contrast, during the same period Deng did not receive any guests from the Soviet Union, let alone visit the country.
Internal Chinese politics also affected Deng's preference for the United States and neglect of the Soviet Union. Decision-making power was shared at the time by Deng's pro-reform group and that of the conservative Chen Yun. While Deng advocated the U.S.-style market economy, Chen lobbied for a Soviet-style planned economy. As the conservatives had no effective international support after the Sino-Soviet relationship went cold, decision-making power naturally went to the reformists.
It was not until Mikhail Gorbachev took office and pushed his reform policies that Deng began to show an interest in improving relations with Moscow. By this time China was beginning to succeed in its domestic reforms and the Soviet Union, with its new policy orientation, was unlikely to support the conservatives in the Chinese Communist Party.
(To be continued)
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(Wu Jiaxiang is a renowned economic and political scholar and a former visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research. His research covers economics, domestic and international politics, business strategy, and Chinese traditional strategy and thought. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original was published in "Trends" magazine of May 2007 and may be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Wu Jiaxiang.)
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