WU JIAXIANG
BEIJING, Jul. 17
Sino-U.S. relations hit a great reef in June 1989 when the Tiananmen Square incident occurred. This reef would have appeared sooner or later anyway. When a great democratic nation and a totalitarian regime approach one another, they will eventually discover the gulf between them. This is the gulf of values and the belief in liberty and democracy.
Although one may say that the Tiananmen Square incident was China's internal affair, the Chinese government's actions contradicted the U.S. belief in human rights as a universal value, so the United States unavoidably imposed sanctions on China. Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping was very aware of this point and did not want to worsen relations with the United States.
Nevertheless, the Tiananmen Square incident and resulting U.S. sanctions were not a real crisis in relations between the two countries. An even greater crisis occurred during the Kosovo War in May 1999, when the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia was bombed by NATO forces. We cannot simply explain this as an accident or mistaken target. In fact, this incident was related to the changing geopolitical situation and also a shift in the regime in China.
After the 15th Chinese Communist Party Congress in 1997, China's overall power was enhanced remarkably. Jiang Zemin's power was consolidated at that congress, the centralization of power in the hands of one individual reaching its highest point in Communist Party history. This gave Jiang the illusion that he had become the leader of a world-class great nation.
However, Jiang also felt that the ideological foundations of the Chinese Communist Party were collapsing. In the eyes of some CCP thinkers, nationalism was a possible substitute for communist ideology. To challenge the U.S.-led NATO forces during the Kosovo War would demonstrate the "hero quality" of the leader of a great nation and stir up the patriotism and nationalism of the Chinese people.
But the nature of Chinese society had already changed -- from a totalitarian society to an authoritarian society. Confronting the United States would damage the country's economic growth. This would not benefit the capitalist children of the high-level leaders or the new middle class. These people, who were becoming the dominant group in Chinese society, would not approve of an anti-U.S. policy.
Some college students demonstrated against the Belgrade bombing at the U.S. Embassy in the morning, and were standing in line to register for the TOEFL English language test in the afternoon. This is a vivid portrayal of Chinese society at that time, and indicates the difficulty of maintaining a policy of conflict with the United States.
The current CCP leadership inherited the social and political structure of the Jiang period but did not inherit the centralization of power on one individual. This is good news for Sino-U.S. relations. First, traces of totalitarianism are gradually being eliminated from the regime as China moves through authoritarianism toward a more free society.
Regarding ideology, neither Marxism nor nationalism can be the basis of the ruling party's legitimacy. The Three Represents theory adopted at the 16th CCP Congress (that the Party represents advanced productive forces, advanced culture and the broad masses of the people) demonstrates that the government has realized its current legitimacy rests on economic growth. The United States has the greatest impact on China's economic growth; therefore good Sino-U.S. relations are one element on which the Party's legitimacy depends.
Secondly, the highest decision-making power of the CCP is once again distributed among several leaders, which will cause another round of competition for power. The strategy of the leading group to strengthen its rule is to continue economic reforms and win public support. Deng Xiaoping established unsurpassed authority through reforms, which encourages the current leaders to imitate his practice. Once reforms move to the political sphere, China and the United States will draw closer in political values. The development of Sino-U.S. relations is directly related to China's internal reforms.
Thirdly, Hu Jintao, Wen Jiabao and Zeng Qinghong, the key figures among the current leadership, all grew up during the Deng Xiaoping reform period. Hu and Wen were trained and promoted by former General Secretary Hu Yaobang, and looked after by Deng. It is more than a guess to predict that they will maintain a friendly policy toward the United States.
Finally, a number of CCP leaders have sent their children or other relatives to the United States to study, work or become U.S. citizens, which is an invisible link sustaining Sino-U.S. relations.
In brief, further liberation of Chinese society will reduce the value differences between China and the United States. Dependence on economic growth will sustain China's need for the United States. And the decentralization of high-level power will push China's political reforms. Under the fourth generation leadership, all these things have already taken place, are taking place now, or will take place. Therefore, in conclusion, the consolidation of the fourth generation of CCP leadership means that Sino-U.S. relations will enter their best period since the CCP came to power in mainland China.
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(Wu Jiaxiang is a renowned economic and political scholar and a former visiting scholar at Harvard University's Fairbanks Center for East Asian Research. His research covers economics, domestic and international politics, business strategy, and Chinese traditional strategy and thought. This article is translated and edited from the Chinese by UPI Asia Online; the original was published in "Trends" magazine of May 2007 and can be found at www.ncn.org. ©Copyright Wu Jiaxiang.)
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